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A variety of contract typologies that exist in the literature are helpful in the exploration of different approaches in
contractual relations, but only when measured with the right instruments. Although Transaction Cost Economics
(TCE) has a distinct, high-level, and abstract typology for contracts, it still lacks a measurement scale. In this
paper, a measurement scale for the TCE contract typology (classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts) was
developed and validated, using systems thinking approach and experimental design to contribute to the
empirical tests of TCE within the contracting realm. First, the antecedents of contract selection within the TCE
literature were analyzed using the systemigram technique to visualize and parse out complex relationships that
lead to contract selection. The analysis of the TCE Systemigram helped the development of the scale and revealed
the need to revisit the risk neutrality assumption embedded in TCE. Second, a measurement scale for the TCE
contract typology (classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts) was developed adhering to the original texts
of seminal papers and reviews from the TCE literature. Third, the 14-item measurement scale was validated using
a series of three vignette-based experimental studies.
Key message: This research explores the antecedents of the TCE contract typology and develops a measurement
scale for essential characteristics of classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts, as defined in TCE, using
systems thinking approach and a novel vignette-based experimental design.

1. Introduction
Even though Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory has been
applied to purchasing and supply management (PSM) in many contexts,
its contract selection and management insights have largely been
overlooked, partly due to the lack of an established measurement scale
of TCE contract types. The main goal of this research is to address this
gap in the literature by developing and validating a measurement scale
for TCE contract types, which will enable further research on contract
selection in the purchasing and supply management field through the
lenses of TCE theory.
Contract selection is a key yet understudied phase of contracting
within the purchasing and supply management field (Wynstra et al.,
2019). The magnitude of annual revenues represented in contracts with

suppliers for firms in utilities, aerospace, defense, and food
manufacturing can be as high as 90% yet on average only 1% of annual
revenue is spent across industries for contract development and vendor
management (Belotserkovskiy et al., 2018). Suboptimal contract terms
and lack of effective contract management might have an impact of as
high as 9% of annual revenues (Belotserkovskiy et al., 2018), implying
that there is an additional value that could be unlocked with a better
understanding of contracting.
Make or buy decision is a central and recurring issue that confronts
the managers in purchasing and supply management circles.
Outsourcing is a powerful managerial choice to leverage a firm’s inter
nal and external resources, capabilities, and competencies (Mantel et al.,
2006). Outsourcing would allow firms to free up resources that are much
needed for innovative, more profitable products or their core

competencies. In this regard, make or buy decision takes on a strategic
prominence that could help business thrive (Leenders et al., 2006). From
a contracting perspective, both decisions (insourcing and outsourcing)
entail some form of contract, which implies critical importance.
Concentrating on transactions between and within firms, the TCE
research produced valuable knowledge in the contracting field to both
academia and practitioners.
TCE has drawn much attention in the past decades among a diverse
group of scholars ranging from economics to organizational theory to
even political science. Marketing scholars were the pioneers, especially
in the empirical exploration of TCE, mainly since TCE takes economic
exchange as the focal unit of analysis between firms. Purchasing and
supply management discipline also extensively used TCE. In their
assessment of the use of external grand theories in purchasing and
supply management, Spina et al. (2016) reported that TCE was by far the
most adopted framework (57 out of 102 occurrences of 12 grand theories they searched for). Wynstra et al. (2019), echoed this finding and
established that TCE was the most frequently applied theory in PSM over
the past two decades. This is no surprise since TCE endeavors to explain
the make-or-buy dilemma and the ensuing buyer-supplier relationship,
which is one of the topics covered most by PSM literature (Spina et al.,
2016). Of all the PSM topics studied, contract management was found to
be the most grand-theory-based topic (Spina et al., 2016). It is also
interesting to note that although Giunipero et al. (2018), in their effort
to identify the most applied theories in sourcing, have also confirmed
TCE’s prominence, they also found that the use of TCE in sourcing was in
decline in recent years. This paper aims to open a new avenue of
research in contract selection by offering a vignette-based measurement
scale of TCE contract types. Treating a firm as the epicenter of governance of economic activity and focusing on transactions between and
within firms, TCE has much to offer for contracting research in purchasing and supply management (Hoffmann et al., 2013). Many of the
constructs and assumptions in TCE, such as governance structures, asset
specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism have been heavily
studied in prior research (Rindfleische, 1996; Schermann et al., 2016).
However, contract types, transaction frequency, and risk neutrality
received less attention among scholars (Saussier, 2000; Wynstra et al.,
2019).
As a theoretical and methodological approach, systems thinking has
also been rarely applied to TCE. The complex nature of relationships
between TCE constructs calls for a systems understanding that enables
scholars to visualize and parse out effects of various constructs on each
other and the system as a whole, as firms strive to select the best
governance structure/contract type to minimize transaction costs. Utilizing systemigram - a systemic diagramming technique - was deemed
appropriate to reveal the essence of the original conceptual thinking
using the structured seminal texts from the TCE literature.
TCE literature provides testable insights on contract selection. To
mitigate the risks arising from the inherent nature of contracting, Williamson (1979) argues that some situations require protective safeguards ranging from simple realignment of incentives upfront (classical
contracts) to creating a specialized governance structure for resolving
disputes (neo-classical contracts), to introducing trading regularities
which signal and insinuate continuity (relational contracts). Thus,
drawing from the contract law literature, Williamson (1979) proposes a
distinct, abstract, and high-level contract typology: classical,
neo-classical, and relational contracts. The complex mix of conjectured
relationships is built on this well-defined contract typology.
Extant literature uses a mix of typologies of contracts construed for a
variety of disciplines or research programs. Various typologies could
broaden the number and width of angles to be examined in contractual
relations, but only if measured with the right instruments. Establishing
the nomological validity of a typology and its measurement scale against
others is of utmost importance for proper scholarly interpretation. The
main purpose of this paper is to take a step forward in this direction with
regards to TCE contract typology. Even though TCE is reported as one of

the most utilized theories in contract management research (Giunipero
et al., 2018; Spina et al., 2016) within the purchasing and supply
management realm as well as within other related fields, it still lacks a
measurement scale for TCE contract typology. In the few studies where
TCE’s approach to contracting was examined, scholars either used a
different typology (Adler et al., 1998) or used contract completeness
(Nyrhinen and Dahlberg, 2007) or interviews (Lacity and Willcocks,
1995) to operationalize the TCE contract typology. Adler et al. (1998)
explored how TCE dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty, and
contract incompleteness could explain various contract types, which
differ along with transactions in terms of content, performance in
centives, and division of gains. However, they used a different contract
typology developed by Brittelli et al. (1983): cost-plus fixed fee,
firm-fixed-price, and incentive contracts. How well this typology could
be approximated to the TCE contract typology is yet to be debated and
left untouched in this research. The other two studies mentioned above
(Nyrhinen and Dahlberg, 2007; Lacity and Willcocks, 1995) did use the
TCE contract typology but did not develop a measurement scale to
operationalize contract types of TCE. TCE contract typology is
embedded in four different purchase scenarios as discussed in Wil
liamson’s (1979) paper and any attempt that falls short of addressing the
purchase scenarios and TCE contract types together, differentiating
contract types from the governance structures may not fill the void
within the contracting research using TCE framework. On the other
hand, a vignette-based measurement scale of contract types that address
each of the purchasing scenarios, solely developed and validated for the
TCE framework will enable scholars to put TCE propositions into more
robust testing, eliminating possible confounding effects that might sur
face with the use of a mixed contract type measurement scale or insuf
ficient operationalization.
This paper aims to contribute to the study of purchasing and supply
management in several ways. First, a comprehensive TCE Systemigram
was created to visually illustrate the intricate interrelationships of the
TCE framework. Using the systemigram technique, a systems thinking
approach was employed to the main premises of TCE to envisage and
deconstruct complex relationships described in TCE with a focus on
improving the understanding of contracting. Second, a measurement
scale was developed and validated for classical, neo-classical, and rela
tional contracts as defined in TCE. A measurement scale that captures
the key characteristics of TCE contract typology might become a valu
able instrument. The use of this scale for TCE research might improve
the validity of future studies in the contracting context. In all, this
research (1) produces a Systemigram of TCE constructs as they relate to
contract selection, thereby enhances and visualizes the understanding of
TCE theory; (2) develops, validates, and verifies a measurement scale for
TCE contract typology; enabling future research, in which risk neutrality
and other behavioral assumptions of TCE for contract selection will be
put to more robust empirical testing.
This paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 discusses rele
vant literature and provides a theoretical background to the scale
development and validation in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results
of the analysis of the TCE Systemigram and scale development process.
The paper ends with concluding remarks, implications, and contribu
tions in Section 5.
2. Literature review on contracts in Transaction Cost Economics
An in-depth grasp of the complex interrelationships of concepts and
constructs in the TCE framework is necessary to understand the theo
retical background underneath the TCE contract typology. TCE’s ana
lytic framework relies on three main assumptions about human behavior
(i.e., bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk neutrality) and three
key dimensions or characteristics of transactions, asset specificity, un
certainty, and transaction frequency. (Geyskens et al., 2006; Rindfleisch
and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1979). Transaction cost economics sug
gests that firms’ choice of hierarchies (in-house production/vertical

integration), hybrid governance, or markets as an economic governance
structure depends on the costs and difficulties associated with market
transactions (Borys and Jemison, 1989).
The governance approach in TCE suggests that structure decisions
are influenced mainly by the urge to economize on transaction costs
(Williamson, 2002). The basic questions revolve around make or buy
dilemma. Each generic mode of governance is supported by a distinctive
form of contract law. As investments become more specific to the
buyer/seller relationship, anticipation is that cost-minimizing institutional choice will respond by moving from simple anonymous market
contracting (classical contracts) to more complex long-term contractual
arrangements with protective provisions (relational or neo-classical
contracts) and ultimately to vertical integration (Williamson, 1985;
Joskow, 1988).
The contract typology in TCE has its differences and resemblances to
other extant contractual conceptualizations. At the grand theory level,
there is a deeper philosophical distinction (in terms of contracting) between TCE and other grand theories such as the Agency Theory and the
Resource-Based View (RBV) (Gulbrandsen et al., 2009). The primary
motivation for contracting is incentive alignment in the Agency Theory,
whereas the RBV emphasizes resource use and deployment (Gulati,
1995). In TCE, transactional relationships are at the center of contracting literature. Thus, the discussion of the characteristics of contracts
varies depending on what theory is being used.
Williamson’s (1979) contract typology laid out the groundwork for
the development of a variety of contractual typologies in the literature
(Lee et al., 2003). Later studies expanded from TCE typology and
adapted a diverse set of means to derive alternative frameworks. Heide
(1994), on the basis of TCE, resource dependence perspective, and
relational contracting theory suggested a framework of market, unilateral/hierarchical non-market, and bilateral governance, where market
governance is described as a discrete exchange and non-market governance as relational (Dwyer et al., 1987). Lusch and Brown (1996) based
their work on Macneil (1980) social contract concept and proposed
explicit/hard contracts and normative/soft contracts as the two major
forms of contracts to govern the relationships. Another angle taken by
some scholars was based solely on control structures (Dahlstrom and
Nygaard, 1999), which was coined as formalization and interfirm
cooperation. Houston and Johnson (2000), on the other hand, proposed
the dichotomy of buyer-supplier contracts vs. joint ventures in their
effort to examine interfirm relationship structures. All these frameworks
or typologies have their differences from the TCE contract typology of
classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts.
A classical contract is when a firm goes out to the market and proposes a fixed price to pay for some good or service, and receives bids
from potential suppliers (Macneil, 1977; Williamson, 1979; Eckerd and
Girth, 2017). This is an advantage for the buyer since the risk of cost
overrun is fully transferred to the supplier. Supplier bears all risks and
manages all activities so, the buyer has less involvement, leading to
minimal transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). The downside with the
classical contracts is that as uncertainty and specificity of transaction
rise, it becomes harder to draft a complete contract, which may lead to
unsatisfactory delivery at the end of the contract duration (Macneil,
1977; Williamson, 1979).
A neo-classical contract is dependent upon trilateral governance,
where “third-party assistance” is used for resolving disputes or evaluating performance. (Macneil, 1977; Williamson, 1979). This contract
type assumes the terms and conditions are more uncertain. Most risks
are taken by the buyer. It is often perceived by the buyer that the supplier might behave opportunistically, which requires costly monitoring
over the progress and the quality of the supplier’s performance (Williamson, 1979). The upside of a neo-classical contract is that the chances
of satisfactory delivery are much higher, frictions between buyer and
supplier are much easily resolved due to third-party assistance, albeit for
a higher cost.
A relational contract is based upon a relationship of trust between

the parties. The explicit terms of the contract (if there are any) are just a
framework (Macneil, 1977). But there are implicit terms and un
derstandings which determine the behavior of the parties. It requires
extensive buyer involvement, thus increasing overall transaction costs
along with overall costs due to incentivized cost mechanism (Wil
liamson, 1979). However, the chances of satisfactory delivery are much
higher, and in the long run, the total cost might come down due to
continuity (Macneil, 1977; Williamson, 1979).
In TCE, parties of a contract share two central behavioral assump
tions. First is that their ability to receive, store, retrieve, and process
information is strictly limited due to bounded rationality (Williamson,
1979). Second, they are both motivated for “self-interest seeking with
guile”, i.e., opportunism which levels the rules of the game for both
parties, in which calculated efforts to misinform, mask, and confuse are
thus self-proclaimed. (Williamson, 1979, 1985). Williamson argues that
problems of a contract are immensely complicated by bounded ratio
nality and opportunism and asserts that these two behavioral assump
tions are givens in any contracting context, whereas asset specificity and
transaction frequency are the two variables that might be present at
various levels depending on the type of transaction at hand (Williamson,
1979). Overall, Williamson argues that the ramifications of differences
in bounded rationality, opportunism, asset specificity, and transaction
frequency coupled with uncertainties are the key issues to be tackled in
contracting (Williamson, 1985).
Williamson explored the foregoing relations among governance
structures and contract types in his 1979 article as shown in Table 1.
Treating governance structures and contract types as a function of
transaction frequency and asset specificity, Williamson (1979) made
distinct predictions on how firms would behave when faced with
different combinations of these two variables. For various purchasing
scenarios, the type of contracting predicted was different due to varia
tion in levels of transaction frequency and asset specificity of that pur
chase. Standard component/material, standard equipment, customized
component/material, and customized equipment-plant are the main
four categories of purchases that correspond to a certain type of contract
within TCE contract typology; classical for the first two purchases,
relational for the third, and neo-classical for the fourth.
As discussed before, risk neutrality is also one of the main assump
tions for these predictions. An in-depth review and analysis of the an
tecedents to the predictions in Table 1 is necessary to reveal the
underlying mechanisms and create a deeper understanding of Wil
liamson’s (1979) line of thought, before delving into the effort to
develop a scale for TCE contract typology. The systemigram technique
might be helpful in this effort.
The use of diagrams to epitomize a system’s form, fit, function,
Table 1
Governance Structures and Contract Types (Merged from two tables in Wil
liamson, 1979).
Asset Specificity

Transaction
Frequency

Occasional

Recurrent

Nonspecific

Mixed

Transactionspecific

Market
Governance
Classical
contracting
Purchasing
standard
equipment
Market
Governance
Classical
contracting
Purchasing
standard
material/
component

Hybrid Governance
Neo-classical contracting
Purchasing customized
equipment-constructing a plant
Bilateral
governance
Relational
contracting
Purchasing
customized
material/
component

Unified
governance
Relational
contracting
Site-specific
transaction
across stages

component, or environment is prevalent in systems engineering to help
create a shared vision about the system (Cloutier et al., 2015). Due to the
inherent limitations of these diagrams in their ability to capture multiple
and divergent perspectives, systemigram, as a novel systemic diagramming technique has been proposed to alleviate shortcomings (Cloutier
et al., 2015). Systemigrams are deployed for studying the remarkable
elements/factors within a system of interest (Cloutier et al., 2015).
Indeed, a systemigram is a network. It has nodes and links, a beginning,
a flow, and an end. Noun phrases (nodes) specify stakeholders (people,
organizations, conditions, constructs), whereas verb phrases (links)
describe the complex relationships between these nodes (Cloutier et al.,
2015). The first node on the top left is the focal stakeholder and the
bottom right node is the objective of the system. Sub-systems and their
vertical and horizontal inter-relationships are also revealed by a
systemigram.
To this end, in this paper, the systemigram technique was used to
parse out complex relationships within TCE constructs and assumptions
towards contracting. The systemigram will also help visualize the
inherent risks to the parties and their salience in contract selection. In
this regard, a TCE Systemigram was created from the structured text of
seminal papers in the TCE literature by adhering to Williamson’s seminal work (1975; 1979; 1985; 1991; 2002; 2008), and to the reviews and
conceptual papers in TCE (David and Han, 2004; Foss and Jensen, 2019;
Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Schermann et al., 2016). By characterizing
the interrelationships and structuring them into a graphical presentation, the TCE Systemigram captures the essence of the original conceptual thinking.
The first step in creating the TCE systemigram was to capture the
main objective of TCE in one sentence, which is called the mainstay in
the systemigram technique (the mainstay of the TCE Systemigram is
represented in bold black arrows in Fig. 1.): TCE posits that firms faced by
the threat of opportunism operate in a risk-neutral business environment and
are restrained with bounded rationality as they strive to decide on the most
suitable governance structures and the ensuing contract types to minimize
transaction costs (Williamson, 1975).
The next steps are to identify how the constructs and assumptions in
the mainstay are described in the structured text and create “scenes” for
each one of them also depicting any inter-relationships. Fig. 2 depicts

the opportunism construct within the TCE Systemigram. The “mixed”
and “idiosyncratic (transaction-specific)” categories in Table 1 for asset
specificity was merged in the Systemigram because the focus of this
paper is on contracts not on governance, and the predictions of Wil
liamson (1979) concerning contracts do not vary for “mixed” and
“idiosyncratic” realms. Therefore, asset specificity is treated in two
levels: nonspecific (low) and transaction-specific (high). In this regard,
as shown in Fig. 2: Opportunism surfaces when asset specificity is high and
creates a safeguarding problem, which in the end increases total transaction
costs. At the same time, high transaction frequency increases opportunism.
Fig. 3 shows how the bounded rationality construct works within the
TCE framework: Bounded rationality coupled with environmental and
behavioral uncertainty creates adaptation and performance evaluation
problems respectively, causing the firm to incur renegotiation and monitoring
costs, which as a result increases the total cost of a transaction.
Fig. 4 describes contract selection within the TCE framework.
Transaction frequency is defined as recurrent (high) or occasional (low),
describing the rate of repetition of a certain transaction. In TCE,
governance structures and contract types are dependent on various
levels of transaction frequency and asset specificity (Rindfleisch and
Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1979).
Various combinations of transaction frequency and asset specificity
and the ensuing contract types, depicted in Table 1, can be followed in
Fig. 4 from right to left: (1) when transaction frequency is occasional and
asset specificity is high, hybrid governance and the neo-classical contract
might be chosen to minimize transaction costs (1st line from the right); (2)
when transaction frequency is recurrent and asset specificity is high, hybrid
governance and the relational contract might be chosen to minimize trans
action costs (2nd line from the right); (3) when transaction frequency is
occasional and asset specificity is low, market governance and the classical
contract might be chosen to minimize transaction costs (3rd line from the
right); (4) when transaction frequency is recurrent and asset specificity is
low, market governance and the classical contract might be chosen to mini
mize transaction costs (4th line from the right). (5) When transaction fre
quency is recurrent and asset specificity is very high, hierarchical governance
(vertical integration) might be chosen to minimize transaction costs (5th line
from the right);
The final step of creating the TCE Systemigram (Fig. 5) is combining

Fig. 1. TCE systemigram - mainstay.

Fig. 2. TCE systemigram - opportunism.

Fig. 3. TCE systemigram – bounded rationality.

all the previously created “scenes” that show all the complex in
terrelationships among TCE constructs as they pertain to the minimi
zation of transaction costs. As observed in the Systemigram, bounded
rationality, uncertainties (environmental and behavioral), and oppor
tunism are ever-present, external factors in the overall context of any
transaction. They all need to be considered and have an indirect effect
on contract selection according to TCE theoretical framework. However,
transaction frequency and asset specificity are the two variables that are
inherent in any transaction and play a more crucial role in contract se
lection. In other words, the interaction between various levels of
transaction frequency and asset specificity together is more of an in
ternal factor and serves as the direct antecedents to contracting

decisions. Applying systems thinking approach to TCE contracting
framework using the systemigram technique was instrumental to visu
alize and illustrate these subtle nuances in the over-convoluted TCE
theoretical framework.
Another outcome of the analysis of the TCE Systemigram was the
highlighting of the presence of contract types as substantive variables
distinct from the governance structures. For decades, exploration of
contractual relations in TCE literature has paused at the governance
structure level and either assumed that certain governance structures
automatically lead to certain contractual paradigms as envisaged by
Williamson (1979) or overlooked the contractual ramifications of
governance structures totally (Foss and Jensen, 2019; Rindfleisch and

Fig. 4. TCE systemigram – contract selection.

Fig. 5. TCE systemigram.

Heide, 1997; Schermann et al., 2016). On the contrary, one can argue
that contractual arrangements are at the forefront of inter-firm relations
and should carry no less weight than governance structures in academic
research. Yet, as Adler et al. (1998) aptly argued, without the empirical
verification of the predicted relationship between governance structures
and contract types, the claims that TCE predictions for governance
would also hold for contracts are merely anecdotal than factual.

Furthermore, lack of empirical evidence to substantiate the existence of
contract types as a continuum of governance structures was one of the
issues that sparked criticism of TCE in the late 1990s (Moran and Gho
shal, 1996; Ghoshal and Moran 1996).
In the few studies that explored contracting within the TCE frame
work, the well-defined TCE contract typology received only insubstan
tial attention. In some cases, scholars abstained from using TCE

terminology, and used a different typology, as was the case with Adler
et al. (1998) who preferred to use firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee,
and incentive contracts as contract types in their research to test the
validity of TCE dimensions on contract selection. In other cases, where
scholars used TCE contract typology, TCE contract types were either
operationalized by only as levels of contract completeness (shortening,
lengthening the description of contract type in the questionnaire)
(Nyrhinen, and Dahlberg, 2007) or by categorization of the contract
types as a result of the coding of interviews conducted with managers
(Lacity, and Willcocks, 1995). This drawback can be attributed to the
lack of a distinct measurement scale for TCE contract typology. The
robustness of future research on the TCE contracting paradigm may be
immensely enhanced by the development of a measurement scale for the
essential characteristics of TCE contract types.

3. Methodology of scale development and validation
A vignette-based experimental methodology was selected for scale
validation for several reasons. First, the purpose of this research is to
explore the distinct characteristics of classical, neo-classical, and rela
tional contracts that separate these contract types from each other from
the perspective of TCE. A vignette-based experimental design is wellmatched to examine the subtle differences in human decision-making
because it allows researchers to observe the direct impact of a change
in a factor on a dependent variable (Eckerd, 2016). Second, the problem
of retrospective biases, memory lapses, and post-rationalization when
asked to recall past experience are almost non-existent in vignette-based
experiments (Finch, 1987; Grewal et al., 2008; Lu et al., 2019). Third,
vignette-based experiments have been demonstrated as a viable meth
odology in various purchasing and supply chain management contexts
((Davis-Sramek et al., 2018; Kaufmann et al., 2018; Lu et al., 2019;
Polyviou et al., 2018). Fourth, as reported by Spina et al. (2016),
experimental design is a rarely applied methodology in PSM research,
inhibiting the study of behavioral influences in much detail. Therefore, a
vignette-based experimental design for scale validation was deemed

appropriate.
Established scale building recommendations and past scaledevelopment studies and reviews were followed to develop a scale for
measuring contract types within the TCE contract typology (e.g.,
Ambulkar et al., 2015; Bottger et al., 2017; Churchill, 1979; Gerbing and
Anderson, 1988; Hensley, 1999; Shah and Ward, 2007; Baxter, R., 2009;
Menor and Roth, 2007; Roth et al., 2008). The initial item generation
was followed by three vignette-based experimental studies (Eckerd,
2016), including scale purification and initial validation, an examina
tion of nomological validity, an exploration of the convergent and
discriminant validity, and tests for the experimental and predictive
validity. A detailed roadmap of scale development methods and data
collection is shown in Fig. 6 (Froehle and Roth, 2004; Roth et al., 2008).
In line with Baxter (2009), the first step of the scale development was
devoted to considerations on using formative or reflective specifications.
The use of reflective scales means that scale items are indicators of the
measured construct, and thus they correlate moderately strongly. On the
other hand, in the formative scales, the indicators are independent
“causes” of the measured construct with little correlation, and that their
collective presence is necessary to adequately specify the measured
construct (Baxter, 2009). As debated in the literature, conceptualization
is the key to choose from formative or reflective scales, and that both
could be appropriate in line with the research questions. In this paper,
the use of reflective scale development was deemed appropriate for
several reasons. First, various characteristics that are attributed to
classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts within the TCE literature
are not independent causes that form the different contract types. These
characteristics are described as indicators of the TCE contract typology
(Williamson, 1979). Second, contract types are discussed within specific
purchase scenarios, the result of which is those specific contract char
acteristics such as the ability to fix the price, the need for arbitration, or
the need for a high level of relationship with the supplier are not caused
by the contract selection but they are more so reflected better within
certain contract schemes.

Fig. 6. Scale & vignette development and validation process.

3.1. Item generation
As a first step, a set of items encompassing general aspects of TCE
contract typology was developed. Initially, 19 items were generated for
classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts from a thorough examination of the TCE literature (e.g. Joskow, 1988; Macneil, 1974; 1977;
Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1979, 1985, 2002, 2003,
2010). The seminal work that defines TCE contract typology is Williamson’s 1979 article named “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”. The scale items were mainly generated
adhering to the above article. Williamson’s later articles and books and
other seminal work from the TCE literature cited above were called upon
to increase the face validity and capture the progression of the TCE
contract typology over time. The items generated (a detailed explanation of TCE contract types and references are discussed in detail within
the Literature Review section of this paper) captured general characteristics of classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts. A panel of
eight experts (professors and Ph.D. students with past purchasing and
procurement experience from an R1 public university in the southwest
USA) evaluated the initial pool of generated items for face and content
validity to assess how well the measurement items are reflective of the
constructs of interest i.e TCE contract types: classical, neo-classical and
relational contracts (Anderson and Gerbing, 1991; Froehle and Roth,
2004). Items were retained following the expert review.
3.2. Vignette design and validation/study 1 (pilot
The literature review has not revealed any studies that used a
vignette, or a scenario to measure contract type preferences. Thus, the
vignette-based experimental instrument was created after reviewing
various scenario-based studies on topics ranging from make or buy decision (Mantel et al., 2006), resilience (Ambulkar et al., 2015), and
supply chain sustainability (Davis-Sramek et al., 2018). The novel vignettes in this research were created by adhering to Williamson’s (1979)
purchase scenarios: standard component/material, standard equipment,
customized component/material, and customized equipment. To ensure
that vignettes were realistic, believable, and effective, best practices
were followed as delineated in Bachrach and Bendoly (2011) and Rungtusanatham et al. (2011). The four vignettes differed from each other in
terms of the frequency and specificity of the transaction. The participants were requested to choose the characteristics of the contract that
they see fit for each purchase scenario. Following recommendations by
Rungtusanatham et al. (2011), in the predesign stage, the language and
description were aligned with prior research in behavioral
decision-making literature and TCE literature. Additionally, in all vignettes, the text was common and invariant except manipulations and
avoided cues as to the expectations of the experiment (Martin, 2004).
In line with Williamson (1979), four purchase scenarios were created
(see Appendix A) such that asset specificity and transaction frequency
were manipulated using a complete block design, where all other factors
were held fixed. The participants were instructed to select the best fitting
contract characteristics as the acting purchase/procurement manager of
a global electronics company after they read the scenario randomly
assigned to them. The two independent variables had two levels; low or
high. This was manipulated by the choice of words that described the
purchase scenario (standard vs. customized for asset specificity, and
component vs. equipment for transaction frequency). Second, the same
manipulation was repeated by stating that the item to be purchased was
specific vs. not specific and the frequency was low vs. high. Further, four
separate component/equipment names were used to help the participants visualize the purchase scenarios more realistically. The two independent variables were manipulated in the description of each
scenario as follows: “… which; (1) is/is not easily available in the market
at an equilibrium price, (2) has a standard/requires a customized design
that fits your needs, (3) will be purchased frequently/only occasionally.”
(See Appendix A).

Following the pretest with an online panel, the experimental pro
cedure was refined to ensure manipulation validity (Rungtusanatham
et al., 2011).
3.3. Item refinement/study 1 (pilot)
A pilot study using an online panel (MTurk) of practitioners was
conducted (N = 183) using four different purchase scenarios. As a first
step, participants were instructed to respond to two identifier questions
about their experience in contracting and job expertise. Only those with
experience and relevant expertise were allowed to continue. A pre
liminary exploratory factor analysis was conducted for responses from
each scenario in SPSS, using principal component analysis with varimax
rotation. The limited number of measure items remained (2–3) for each
contract type due to mixed factor loadings lead to an assessment with
the expert panel and resulted in the decision to broaden the initial item
pool. The new item pool included not only the most-pronounced char
acteristics of TCE contract types but also the second-order constructs of
contract types such as price mechanisms, governance types (levels of
involvement, need for arbitration and terms and conditions), and rela
tional attitudes (trust, partnership, past experience, and goal alignment)
(Williamson, 1979). The purpose of the broadening of the item pool was
to increase the granularity of the measurement scale consistent with the
results of the pilot study. The initial pool of 19 items was retained after
some changes in wording, and a total of ten more items were generated
in line with the literature. A detailed table of the item generation process
and final scale is in Appendix B, in line with Shah and Ward (2007).
3.4. Reliability and validity analysis
3.4.1. Study 2
After the results of the pilot Study 1, a second study (Study 2) with 29
scale items was conducted with an online panel (MTurk) of practitioners
using a standard component purchase scenario. First, participants were
asked to respond to two identifier questions measuring their experience
in contracting and job expertise. Only 341 respondents with contracting
experience and suitable job expertise (logistics, supply chain, trans
portation, production, purchasing, operations management) were
allowed to continue with the experiment. Out of the 341 responses
submitted, 115 failed in both attention check questions (Kung et al.,
2018). The remaining 226 responses were used for analysis. On average,
the respondents reported 5.56 years of experience in contracting from a
wide spectrum of industries ranging from automotive to health. Scale
items for contract types were measured after each participant read the
introduction and the standard component purchase scenario (See Ap
pendix A and B). Participants were asked the following question: “Given
the above information, please indicate the essential characteristics of contract
type you would recommend when you are purchasing a standard compo
nent”. Responses to all scale items were measured on a 5 point Likert
scale anchored between strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5).
Measure verification followed a multi-step process. The scale items
measuring contract types were first subjected to exploratory factor
analysis (EFA). The results of the EFA obtained from a principal
component analysis with varimax rotation in SPSS are presented in
Table 2.
First, the factorability of the measure items was examined. The
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was .82
(greater than the recommended value of 0.60), and Bartlett’s test of
sphericity was significant (χ2 = 1090.17, p < .001) (Black and Porter,
1996).
Further, the commonalities were all above 0.3 indicating that each
item shared some common variance with other items. Principal com
ponents analysis with varimax rotation was used because the main
purpose was to identify and calculate composite scores for the factors
underlying contract types. Initial Eigenvalues indicated that the first
three factors explained 29%, 19%, and 8% of the variance respectively.

Table 2
EFA (study 2)-Rotated factor structure.
Scale Item

1

Contract Characteristics
Classical Contract (1)
Question: “When purchasing a standard component ….”
- Giving out price incentives to the supplier are
unnecessary. (7C)
- The final cost to us can be determined upfront. (2C)
- Cost overrun is unacceptable. (3C)
- We do not anticipate additional costs to the supplier other
than those defined in the contract. (4C)
- Setting a fixed price upfront would not jeopardize the
deliverables. (5C)

3

0.76
0.71
0.69
0.60
0.60

Neo-classical contract (2)
Question: “When purchasing a standard component ….”
- The complexity of the purchase justifies third-party
assistance and the extra cost that comes with it. (12N)
- Third-party assistance (arbitration or legal help) is
needed albeit the cost. (11N)
- We anticipate disagreement with the supplier which
dictates costly outside arbitration or legal help. (13N)
- Uncertainties prevent setting a fixed price upfront. (14N)
- Maximal friction between us and the supplier is likely.
(19N)
Relational Contract (3)
Question: “When purchasing a standard component ….”
- We would like to think of the supplier as our partner.
(21R)
- Goal alignment between us and the supplier is necessary.
(24R)
- Implicit terms and understandings between us and the
supplier would serve us well. (27R)
- Positive past experience with the supplier is a must. (20R)
- Cost issues should not supersede our relationship with the
supplier. (8R)
Cronbach’s Alpha

2

0.81
0.78
0.76
0.75
0.72

0.76
0.72
0.66
0.47
0.71

0.60
0.47
0.85

0.75

As cross-loading measure items (above 0.32) are removed, the initial sixfactor solution was consolidated into a three-factor solution, which
explained 56% of the variance (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). The final
factor structure had all items (except 8R) loading over 0.60 or better,
indicating solid factors (Osborne and Costello, 2009). One item (20R)
had a cross-loading of 0.47 where primary loading was 0.60 but was
retained since the item was theoretically justifiable. In all, the
three-factor solution with a total of 15 items (5 each for three constructs)
was deemed appropriate due to theoretical support and the ‘leveling off’
of the Eigenvalues on the scree plot after three factors.
The scale items for the classical, neo-classical, and relational con
tracts were next examined for internal consistency (using Alpha scores),
and convergent and discriminant validity using inter-item correlation
scores (see Tables 2 and 3). All Alpha scores were above 0.70 indicating
acceptable levels of internal consistency (Nunnally, 1978). All
inter-factor correlations within factors were higher than the correlations
across factors, which satisfies the essential criteria for discriminant
validity (Churchill, 1979).
The data were next subjected to the initial confirmatory factor

Table 3
CFA 1 (study 2) - assessment of construct validity.
Classical
Classical
Neo-classical
Relational
a

0.76a
− 0.36
0.23

Neo-classical
0.67a
0.53

Relational

CRb

AVE

0.65a

0.87
0.81
0.78

.58
.45
.42

Square root of average variances extracted are reported along a diagonal
line. Correlations of factors’ composite scores are below the diagonal line.
b
CR = Construct Reliability.

analysis using a structural equation modeling procedure (AMOS, SPSS)
using a variance-covariance matrix (Table 3) (Froehle and Roth, 2004).
The fit indices for the three-factor structures (χ2 = 151.71, df = 84,
p-value = .001; NFI = 0.86, IFI = 0.94, CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.92, and
CMIN/DF = 1.80, RMSEA = 0.06) were within acceptable ranges
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1991; Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; Menor and Roth,
2007). The sample size of 226 used in this study was sufficient for CFA.
Construct validity for the scale items measuring constructs were
assessed using AVE (average variance extracted), and construct reli
ability (CR). All the AVE estimates were close to 0.50, while all the CRs
were above 0.78, which satisfies convergent validity criteria (Fornell
and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2006; Lam, 2012). Further, all multi-item
measures’ AVEs’ square roots are higher than their correlation estimates
with other factors and thus indicating discriminant validity. Overall,
these findings indicate acceptable internal consistency, convergent and
discriminant validity, and construct validity for the scale items used in
this study (see Tables 2 and 3).
Common method bias is a prospective concern in cross-sectional
studies where single informants are used (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Common latent factor method was used (Eichhorn, 2014) to address this
issue. The common latent factor method indicated 32% variance for a
single factor, which is less than the generally accepted benchmark of
50% (Eichhorn, 2014; Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).
Study 2 was conducted with one purchasing scenario to provide an
initial test of the measurement items towards contract types. The stan
dard component purchase scenario was deemed appropriate for Study 2
since it provides a striking contrast for contract feature selection by its
simplicity and straightforwardness as a scenario, eliminating potential
confounding effects. As seen in the initial CFA results, it is noteworthy
that the three contract types were differentiated substantially. Yet, to
increase the robustness of the initial CFA, a third experimental study
(Study 3) was conducted using the full set of four purchasing scenarios.
3.4.2. Study 3
Following Study 2, Study 3 was conducted on MTurk using the four
purchasing scenarios. To increase the validity and reliability of the re
sults, the participants were first asked to answer an identifier question
measuring their level of experience in purchasing (Kung et al., 2018).
Out of 1535 participants, only 435 indicated some experience in pur
chasing and passed the screening question and thus were allowed to
continue with Study 3. Of the 435 participants, 151 failed to respond
correctly to the attention check questions (Kung et al., 2018), and
therefore were removed from the data. 8 of the responses were identified
as outliers using Mahalanobis Distance, Cook’s distance, and boxplot
analysis. The remaining 276 responses were used for analysis. The
participants reported 6.87 years of experience in purchasing on average.
The data analysis followed a stepwise approach. First, the KaiserMeyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was checked and
was found as 0.86 (greater than the recommended value of 0.60), and
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 = 2276.90, p < .001)
(Black and Porter, 1996). Further, the commonalities were all above 0.3
(except 8R = 0.241) indicating shared some common variance.
Next, the final confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using a structural
equation modeling procedure in AMOS-SPSS was conducted (Table 4) to
check construct reliability and construct validity. The final measure
ment model was obtained after several runs of checks for lower loading
factors, modification indices fixes, and standardized residual co
variances. The final model contained 14 scale items as depicted in
Table 4.
The overall model fit was analyzed for absolute model fit, incre
mental fit, and parsimonious fit, and results indicated that the mea
surement model was satisfactory (Anderson and Gerbing, 1991; Bagozzi
and Yi, 1988; Paswan et al., 2015). For the absolute model fit, the final
model χ2 is 140.667, df = 73, (p = .000), indicating mediocre fit be
tween the model implied and sample covariance matrices, which is ex
pected due to the large sample size (276). On the other hand, RMSEA

Table 4
CFA 2 (study 3) - structural equation model estimates.
Parameters
Contract Characteristics
Classical Contract (1)
Question: “When purchasing a ….”
- The final cost to us can be determined upfront.
(2C)
- Setting a fixed price upfront would not jeopardize
the deliverables. (5C)
- We do not anticipate additional costs to the
supplier other than those defined in the contract.
(4C)
- Giving out price incentives to the supplier are
unnecessary. (7C)
Neo-classical Contract (2)
Question: “When purchasing a ….”
- Third-party assistance (arbitration or legal help) is
needed albeit the cost. (11N)
- The complexity of the purchase justifies thirdparty assistance and the extra cost that comes with
it. (12N)
- We anticipate disagreement with the supplier
which dictates costly outside arbitration or legal
help. (13N)
- Maximal friction between us and the supplier is
likely. (19N)
- Uncertainties prevent setting a fixed price upfront.
(14N)
Relational Contract (3)
Question: “When purchasing a ….”
- We would like to think of the supplier as our
partner. (21R)
- Positive past experience with the supplier is a
must. (20R)
- Goal alignment between us and the supplier is
necessary. (24R)
- Implicit terms and understandings between us and
the supplier would serve us well. (27R)
- Cost issues should not supersede our relationship
with the supplier. (8R)

Standardized
Estimates

P
Value

0.80

***

0.71

***

0.53

***

0.50

***

0.80

***
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0.76

***

0.72

***

0.66

***

0.60

***

0.73

***

0.71

***

0.66

***

0.64

***

0.57

***

The purpose of this study was twofold. First, a systemigram was
created of TCE theory to examine complex relationships between TCE
constructs as to how firms make contract type decisions. The analysis of
the TCE Systemigram revealed the fundamental relationships between
various constructs and contract types, which was instrumental in the
scale development process. The TCE Systemigram analysis underlined
the presence of contract types as substantive factors in the TCE frame
work. Throughout the prior research on TCE, contract types were either
treated as an automatic continuum of governance structures as predicted
by Williamson (1979) or neglected (Foss and Jensen, 2019; Rindfleisch
and Heide, 1997; Schermann et al., 2016). The possibility of contractual
arrangements playing roles in more than one governance structure is a
viable future research topic as an outcome of this research. A related
topic is to identify the cognitive and behavioral mechanisms through
which variance between governance structures and contract types can
occur.
The TCE Systemigram was also contributory in identifying the nature
of the relationship among some of the TCE constructs, by visually
depicting that bounded rationality, uncertainties and opportunism are
influential factors to be considered to minimize transaction costs, but
only play an external role in contract selection decision process. In other
words, these factors are ever-present in the milieu but get pronounced
when they interact with levels of the other two variables: asset speci
ficity and transaction frequency, which, in comparison, are the internal
factors that play a more direct role in contract selection.
Another result of the analysis of the TCE Systemigram is the visual
confirmation of the underlying but downplayed and underrepresented
role of risk neutrality in this mix of relationships that lead to contract
selection. The risk neutrality assumption of TCE is embraced as a
simplifying assumption to devote more attention to transactions as the
unit of analysis (Williamson, 1985). However, the findings of prospect
theory and risk propensity research depict a different picture of risk
neutrality (Martynov and Schepker, 2017; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Thus, as a viable future research area,
this paper implies that contract selection might be moderated by the risk
propensities of managers as their perception of the risks that are
inherent in an economic exchange will vary depending on their
propensity.
Second, adhering to TCE literature and the Williamson (1979) con
tract typology a 14-item measurement scale was developed and vali
dated. To this date, much of the TCE research has stopped at the
governance structure level and has not empirically tested the predicted
relationship between governance structures and contract types (Adler
et al., 1998). The prior research conducted on contracts within the TCE
framework either refrained from using the TCE contract typology, and
used a different typology – firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee, and
incentive contracts (Adler et al., 1998) or measured the TCE contract

(0.058) and GFI (0.93) suggest a perfect model fit. Furthermore, for
incremental fit, IFI (0.80) and as for the parsimonious fit, both CMIN/DF
(1.927) and AGFI (0.90) indicate a satisfactory model fit.
To check for convergent and discriminant validity and construct
reliability, calculations of AVE and CR values are given in Table 5
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2006). All the standardized λs
were close or above 0.6 and significant (See Table 4), all of the CRs were
above 0.74, and all of the AVEs were above 0.42 (See Table 5). All of the
inter construct correlations (φ) were less than the square roots of AVEs
for the corresponding constructs. These results indicate a good model fit
and satisfactory levels of internal consistency, convergent, discriminant,
and construct validity (Hair et al., 2006; Paswan et al., 2015).
The experimental, predictive and nomological validity of the scale
was established using the scale in the vignette-based experimental study
(Study 3) to test the effects of asset specificity on contract selection

Table 5
CFA 2 (study 3) - assessment of construct validity.
Classical
Classical
Neo-classical
Relational
a

0.65a
0.01
0.54

Neo-classical
0.71a
0.54

(Narasimhan et al., 2001). A multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA)
was performed to test for the overall significance of the difference in the
means for dependent variables (contract types) at levels of asset speci
ficity. The overall MANOVA result was statistically significant (Pillai’s
Trace = 0.11, F (3, 272) = 11.21, p = .0001), and the multivariate effect
size was estimated as 0.11. The results were shared with members of the
expert panel and received positive feedback, indicating experimental,
predictive, and nomological validity. As a final step, data were analyzed
for common method variance using the common latent factor method
(χ2 difference). The results indicated that there is 30% variance (Com
mon Latent Factor method), which is below the generally accepted
benchmark of 50% (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986; Eichhorn, 2014). Also,
the χ2 difference between constrained and unconstrained models when a
common latent factor added was not statistically significant (χ2 uncon
strained = 94.2 df = 68, χ2 constrained = 94.4 df = 69, p-value for the χ2
difference = 0.65, df = 1).

Relational

CRb

AVE

0.66a

0.74
0.84
0.80

.42
.51
.44

Square root of average variances extracted are reported along a diagonal
line. Correlations of factors’ composite scores are below the diagonal line.
b
CR = Construct Reliability.

types by only levels of contract completeness (shortening, lengthening
the description of contract type in the questionnaire) (Nyrhinen, and
Dahlberg, 2007) or classified them by conducting interviews with
managers and coding their responses (Lacity, and Willcocks, 1995). The
lack of a distinct measurement scale for TCE contract typology could be
argued to diminish the robustness of prior research on contracting in the
realm of TCE theory. Therefore, the theoretical contribution of the scale
to the study of transactions and contracting through the TCE framework
will be paramount.
Managerial implications of this research are also noteworthy.
Enhancing the understanding of factors affecting contract selection, this
paper not only points out the differences of each factor alone but also
sheds light on how interactions among them are related to contract selection. Good contract management can save businesses much-needed
resources, and it all starts with the selection of contract type that suits
best the transaction at hand. Another outcome of this research is the
highlighting of TCE contract typology as an abstract and high-level
taxonomy, which suits better for strategic decision-making in contracting. The scale developed for TCE contract typology could be used as a
starting point in the discussion of which contract would serve the firm
better in their effort to minimize transaction costs and remain
competitive.
Some limitations for this research should be noted. The experimental
design maximizes the internal validity of the findings but comes with
some shortcomings. Often, researchers tend to create extreme variances
in scenarios to ensure that the respondents receive intended treatment
manipulations (Davis-Sramek et al., 2018). This is because experimental
manipulations tend to be notoriously weak, especially in social sciences
research (Davis-Sramek et al., 2018). Despite realism checks, one cannot
guarantee maximal realism. Using a multi-method approach could
remedy this weakness in future studies.
As noted earlier, TCE contract typology is abstract and the measurement scale items devised to adhere to the theoretical underpinnings
of the TCE framework may have been observed by the participating
practitioners as somewhat hard to grasp, which is reflected in the
satisfactory yet border-line AVE scores. This also very well be the case
because relational contracts in comparison to classical or neo-classical
contracts pose a difficulty in scale development. Relational attributes
such as trust, partnership, goal alignment/commitment are powerful
constructs that people crave in their lives and might have pulled respondents unequivocally towards them. This might have possibly
created some bias in the results towards relational measure items.
Similar effects surfaced in prior research. Suprapto et al. (2016) found
that better relational attitudes, teamwork quality, and incentives fully
mediates the relationship between various contract types (traditional vs
relational) and project performance. However, even though classical
contracts like fixed-price contracts have been shown to have a higher
risk of project failure as specification increases (Jorgensen et al., 2017),
nevertheless, they are still being used even for infrastructure projects
(Suprapto et al., 2016). How do we account for what we observe in the
real world and the research findings? Is there a bias towards relational
attributes that is causing this discrepancy? What other factors could be
at play? These are valid research questions that could be answered by
conducting multiple studies with different samples, which might help
assess the existence and/or the strength of the potential bias towards
relational attributes in contract selection by the respondents.
This research was designed by adhering to the well-documented best
practices in the literature for use of the Amazon MTurk (Matherly,
2019). Yet, limitations for data collection innate with the Amazon
MTurk platform could have played some role in the results of this paper

(Stritch et al., 2017). Hence, further studies using various samples might
enhance the validity of the measurement scale developed in this paper.
5. Conclusion
This paper takes systems thinking approach to contracting through
the lens of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory to explore in
terrelationships among main antecedents of contracting in TCE:
opportunism, bounded rationality, uncertainty, risk neutrality, trans
action frequency, and asset specificity. A TCE Systemigram was created
to visualize and examine the complex relationships between contract
types and various levels of transaction frequency and asset specificity as
well as the underlying assumptions of opportunism, bounded rational
ity, uncertainty, and risk neutrality. One of the outcomes of the litera
ture review and the TCE Systemigram analysis was the categorization of
the antecedents to contract selection as external and internal. The TCE
Systemigram analysis revealed that asset specificity and transaction
frequency play a central role as the main antecedents to contract se
lection in the TCE framework. Bounded rationality, uncertainty,
opportunism, and risk neutrality are also influential. These factors are
always present in any transaction context yet have a more external role
than the first two antecedents (asset specificity and transaction fre
quency), which are more specific to transactions and therefore predicted
to exert a more pronounced role on contract selection. The analysis of
the TCE Systemigram has also shown that the fit between risk neutrality
and other constructs needed further exploration. The literature review
also revealed that risk neutrality along with risk perceptions/pro
pensities of managers are understudied topics in contracting. To pave
the way for future research in this area, a measurement scale for TCE
contract typology was developed and validated to empirically test the
Williamson (1979) predictions of how transaction frequency and asset
specificity interact to shape decisions of contract types under risk
neutrality assumption, using a vignette-based experimental design.
The main contribution of this paper to purchasing and supply man
agement field as well as to other related fields is the introduction of a
measurement scale for TCE contract typology of classical, neo-classical,
and relational contracts, which was created and validated using a robust
experimental vignette-based design adhering to the purchasing sce
narios of Williamson’s seminal 1979 article on contractual relationships.
Considering the influence of TCE in many fields of research and the
decades-long history of this grand theory’s evolvement, the limited
number of past research on the contracting premises of TCE separated
from the governance structures is astonishing. TCE contract types are
unique and abstract and are interwoven with carefully constructed
purchasing scenarios that may have implications for modern contracting
practices. The abstractness of the TCE contract typology makes a suit
able tool for rigorous academic research towards the theoretical un
derpinnings of contracting and sourcing. With this novel measurement
scale based on the four purchasing scenarios, researchers will have the
opportunity to delve into new research topics.
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Appendix A. Scale Development – Purchase Scenarios (Vignettes)
Introduction:

Most of the spending in many industries is locked in contracts. There is an additional value that could be unlocked with wise contracting. Contract
types substantially differ from each other. Thus, contract type selection during the pre-contract stage is a crucial factor for a business to thrive. The
specificity and frequency of a transaction are two important factors in contract type selection. Specificity is the value of a certain asset outside the focal
relationship between buyer and supplier. Transaction frequency is the number of occurrences of a certain exchange between the buyer and the
supplier(s), ranging from low to high. Below, you see a table of possible combinations of two attributes and corresponding purchases.

Transaction Frequency

Asset
Specificity

High
Low

Recurrent (High)

Occasional (Low)

Customized Component
Standard Component

Customized Equipment
Standard Equipment

Standard Material/Component Purchase:
- The item is standard, so we can expect plenty of qualified suppliers.
- The item is standard, so we can expect less involvement on our part and lower transaction costs (search, bargaining, renegotiation, performance
evaluation costs, etc.)
- We have a good idea about market prices.
- We can expect to know upfront how much we will pay.
- We can expect no unforeseen costs to the supplier.
- The supplier could be any qualified firm that agrees to the price we offer.
- The level of relationship (trust, goal alignment, etc.) with the supplier is less relevant despite the frequency of purchase is high.
- Terms and conditions can be easily drafted.
- We can expect a smooth transaction, less need for arbitration or legal help.
Standard Equipment/Plant Purchase:
The above characteristics for a standard material/component purchase would mostly apply to the purchase of a standard equipment/plant; except:
- Most firms would need equipment purchase or plant/building construction much less frequently.
- Therefore, a long-term relationship with the supplier might not be necessary.
Customized Material/Component Purchase:
- The item is customized, so we can expect limited qualified suppliers.
- The item is customized, so we can expect more involvement on our part and higher transaction costs (search, bargaining, renegotiation, perfor
mance evaluation costs, etc.)
- We might not have a good idea about market prices.
- It might be hard to know upfront how much we will pay.
- We can expect some unforeseen costs to the supplier that would require reimbursement negotiations.
- Setup costs, design costs might be hard to quantify.
- Not all suppliers would be able to deliver. The supplier selection is more important.
- The level of relationship (trust, goal alignment, etc.) with the supplier might be more important because the frequency of purchase will be high.
- Terms and conditions might be hard to draft.
- We can expect a bumpy transaction, which requires more need for trust between parties.
- Giving incentives to the supplier might increase our costs but also might help the transaction go more smoothly.
Customized Equipment/Plant Purchase:
The above characteristics for a customized material/component purchase would mostly apply to the purchase of a customized equipment/plant;
except:
-

Most firms would need equipment purchase or plant/building construction much less frequently.
Therefore, a long-term relationship with the supplier might not be necessary.
We can expect a bumpy transaction, which requires more need for arbitration or legal help from a third party.
Giving incentives to the supplier will increase our costs and might be unnecessary since the frequency of transactions is low.
Please carefully read the scenario on the next page and answer the questions accordingly.

Scenario 1- Standard Component Purchase:
You are the procurement/purchasing manager of one of the world’s premier electronics manufacturing firm. So, it is your responsibility to evaluate
and make recommendations on contract type selection for all kinds of procurement. You work at the corporate headquarters in New York and the
production takes place in the manufacturing facility in Ohio. Your contract type selection should depend on the specificity and frequency of the
transaction. The top management of the firm has a risk-neutral attitude and has put no restrictions on what contract type to choose, so it is your
decision to make. The firm has decided to outsource one standard component, i.e. a standard capacitor which;

- is easily available in the market at an equilibrium price,
- has a standard design that fits your needs,
- will be purchased frequently.
Therefore, the standard component is not specific and the frequency of purchase is high.
Scenario 2 - Standard Equipment Purchase:
You are the procurement/purchasing manager of … ….
The firm has decided to outsource one standard equipment, i.e. a standard voltmeter which;
- is easily available in the market at an equilibrium price,
- has a standard design that fits your needs,
- will be purchased only occasionally.
Therefore, the standard equipment is not specific and the frequency of purchase is low.
Scenario 3 - Customized Component Purchase:
You are the procurement/purchasing manager of … ….
The firm has decided to outsource one customized component, i.e. a customized switch which;
- is not easily available in the market at an equilibrium price,
- requires a customized design that fits your needs,
- will be purchased frequently.
Therefore, the customized component is specific and the frequency of purchase is high.
Scenario 4 - Customized Equipment Purchase:
You are the procurement/purchasing manager of … ….
The firm has decided to outsource one customized equipment, i.e. a customized semiconductor manufacturing machine which;
- is not easily available in the market at an equilibrium price,
- requires a customized design that fits your needs,
- will be purchased occasionally.
Therefore, the customized equipment is specific and the frequency of purchase is low.
APPENDIX B. Item Generation and Final Scale
Given the above information, please indicate the essential characteristics of contract type you would recommend
when you are purchasing a standard component/standard equipment/customized component/customized
equipment ….” (Likert Scale: 1–5, from strongly disagree to strongly agree)
Notes:
X: Included
X (r): Included after rewording.

Expert
Review1

Study1
(Pilot)
&
Expert
Review 2

Study2 (EFA &
CFA 1

We can set a fixed price, so we know exactly our total cost.
The final cost to us can be determined upfront.
Cost overrun is unacceptable.
We do not anticipate additional costs to the supplier other than those defined in the contract.
Setting a fixed price upfront would not jeopardize the deliverables.
Cost reimbursement to the supplier to make up for the extra costs is unacceptable.
Giving out price incentives to the supplier are unnecessary.
Cost issues should not supersede our relationship with the supplier.
I would prefer a supplier I have worked before despite higher costs.
Incentivizing the supplier monetarily to strengthen our relationship is appropriate although total cost might
increase.
Third-party assistance (arbitration or legal help) is needed albeit the cost.
Complexity of the purchase justifies third-party assistance and the extra cost that comes with it.
We anticipate disagreement with the supplier which dictates costly outside arbitration or legal help.
Uncertainties prevent setting a fixed price upfront.
Constant performance evaluation of the supplier is necessary, which will require extra money and resources.
We do not need much involvement after the contract has been signed.
Extensive monitoring of the supplier performance is necessary, which requires constant involvement on our part.
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(continued on next page)

(continued )
Given the above information, please indicate the essential characteristics of contract type you would recommend
when you are purchasing a standard component/standard equipment/customized component/customized
equipment ….” (Likert Scale: 1–5, from strongly disagree to strongly agree)
Notes:
X: Included
X (r): Included after rewording.

Expert
Review1

Study1
(Pilot)
&
Expert
Review 2

Study2 (EFA &
CFA 1

Any qualified supplier would get the job done.
Maximal friction between us and the supplier is likely.
Positive past experience with the supplier is a must.
We would like to think of the supplier as our partner.
Mutual trust based on past business experience is an absolute necessity.
A long-term relationship with the supplier is a must.
Goal alignment between us and the supplier is necessary.
We can draft a detailed and formal terms and conditions.
Written terms and conditions monitored by a third party is a must.
Implicit terms and understandings between us and the supplier would serve us well.
Mutual understanding is more important than written terms and conditions.
Adaptation of the initial agreement will be necessary as we go along.
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